



**Rickmansworth Waterways Trust**  
**Rickmansworth Festival – Standing**  
**Security Management Plan**

**Document Number R06**

**Date Reviewed and Approved by the Trustees – 2019**



### Updated for the Festival 2019

The threat to the security of the Festival is fundamentally different from that to our safety. A failure of our safety regime will affect only a small number of people, perhaps only individuals, while a security incident has the potential to affect hundreds of people very severely and quickly. This document is therefore issued separately from the Safety Management Plan, which refers to it but does not expand on it.

This Plan refers to, and implements for the Festival, the Crowded Places Guidance issued by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO). This is aimed at events where there may be a risk of a terrorist attack, either because of the nature of the event or the number or nature of the people attending, and the Festival is clearly vulnerable in this way. We consider the Festival to fall under the Major Events sector as described in the Guidance, even though relatively small and occurring only once a year.

The Guidance accepts that the concept of absolute security is almost impossible to achieve in combating the threat of terrorism, but we seek to use the Guidance to reduce the risk to our visitors to be 'as low as reasonably practicable'. It is nonetheless important to us to maintain a friendly and welcoming atmosphere within our 'major event' environment, and this too is recognised by the Guidance. We know that if our Festival is to be safe and secure the preparations we make on protective security will have to be undertaken in partnership with the Hertfordshire police, Three Rivers District Council and our professional security contractor. The actions we take and prepare to take will be in close conjunction with our neighbours, with our exhibitors and our visitors.

We have discussed the overall situation surrounding the Festival with Hertfordshire Police. Their view is that the Festival is at Low Risk, and that the threat is relatively simple – principally, a vehicle used as a weapon and a man-portable Improvised Explosive Device (IED) (rucksack bomb or package). These are addressed below. Most of this document provides context and a framework for considering our response should the situation change.

## **Responsibility**

The Festival Director has overall responsibility for the Festival arrangements, and managing the risk of terrorism is only one part of his role. This includes preparing contingency plans in response to any incident in or near the Festival which might prejudice volunteer, exhibitor or contractor safety, public safety during the Festival, or disrupt our normal operations.

As for all other aspects of the Festival, the Trustees as a Board are ultimately responsible, and are committed to managing the risks and understanding the consequences of ineffective or unsupportive management.

## Phases of Preparation

We have identified two main phases for our work to mitigate the threat and reduce its impact.

1. In the **planning and preparation stage**, we work on preventing the risk materialising. This is done in measured terms, with (in particular) the Police and TRDC, and will include any training identified as necessary.
2. As we move to **execution**, we are ready to respond to and recover from an interruption to the Festival, regardless of its cause. We should remember that any major incident at the Festival will be of concern to Three Rivers DC as well as other public bodies in the area and county, and will have significant public attention – RWT will not be alone in this. This phase includes
  - a. Emergency Response – in the immediate aftermath of the incident, to safeguard lives, prevent further damage and protect the environment. This stage will have to be conducted by Festival control teams, until the Emergency Services have established their own presence.
  - b. Incident Management – establishing the command and control arrangements, with communications, to coordinate the response, which is likely to include evacuation of the site and closing the Festival. This stage will almost inevitably see a transfer of responsibility to the Emergency Services Incident Commander, but the Festival Control team will still have a crucial role in assisting him.<sup>1</sup>
  - c. Crisis Management – in the aftermath of a major incident there will be many matters to be addressed, which will probably need to be done by a group of people separate from the Incident Management team. This will include Three Rivers DC as well as the Police.
  - d. Business Continuity – ensuring that the other work of the Trust can proceed with as little disruption as possible. If the earlier stages have been executed well, there will be widespread public support: if not, that support has to be won back.
  - e. Recovery – establishing a ‘new normality’, rebuilding and restoring our work and preparing to move ahead, perhaps in a new direction.

## Phase 1 – Preparation

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<sup>1</sup> Higher levels of incident management – Silver and Gold Command etc – will be a matter for the Incident Controller at the time and are not addressed in this document.

- Assessing the Threat, Identifying the Risk.
- Assessing the Festival's vulnerability as a highly-visible public event, including any VIPs or significantly vulnerable public figures.<sup>2</sup>
- Identifying measures to reduce the risk and improve our vulnerability.
- Working them into a simple Security Plan, and briefing our local control staff.
- Testing (and as far as possible rehearse) the measures.
- After the Festival, reviewing the measures we took (hopefully without them being tested 'for real') and assess their impact, realism and practicability. Update this Plan in readiness for the next Festival.

### **Response to changing Threat Levels.**

As the Festival approaches, but ahead of it, we will ensure that we are ready to receive advice on the Threat Levels currently in force. There are **five levels of threat**:

**Critical** An attack is expected imminently

**Severe** An attack is highly likely

**Substantial** An attack is a strong possibility

**Moderate** An attack is possible but not likely

**Low** An attack is unlikely

Nationally, the current level is SEVERE, and it is accepted that an attack somewhere in the country is highly likely.

### **Response Levels**

The threat level does not relate to specific sites such as the Festival. Three Response Levels have been defined, which lay out a broad framework of what to do in specific instances. The three levels of response are:

**Exceptional** Maximum protective security measures to meet specific threats and to minimise vulnerability and risk – unsustainable.

**Heightened** Additional and sustainable protective security measures reflecting the broad nature of the threat combined with specific business and geographical vulnerabilities and judgements on acceptable risk.

**Normal** Routine protective security measures appropriate to the business concerned.

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<sup>2</sup> Mr David Gauke MP, now the Justice Secretary, a regular attender with his family, is an example.

At present the response level is '**Heightened**', and this plan encapsulates the 'additional and sustainable security measures' we think necessary to plan to have in place. It is possible that local Police will receive information about a direct threat, which would have the effect of raising our threat level to Critical but more importantly would require us to make an '**Exceptional**' response: what that is will depend on the police advice, but it is likely that they would recommend (perhaps even require) that the Festival be suspended or cancelled. We have to be ready in advance to do what is required in that case, and our plan is below: it will be seen that a decision to cancel cannot be reversed.

### **Cancellation Considerations**

#### Cancellation before on-site preparation starts (Weds 15 May 2019):

1. Plan the response in detail, but quickly.
2. Public announcements through written and broadcast media, Twitter, Facebook etc.  
Update RWT website.
3. Contact contractors to stop them moving in.
4. Contact exhibitors and boaters.
5. Prepare for financial consequences.

#### Cancellation while on-site preparation is in progress (15, 16, 17 May 2019):

1. Plan the response in detail, but very quickly.
2. Inform contractors already working on site. They should start to dismantle. Their departure will have to be carefully managed.
3. Public announcements through written and broadcast media, Twitter, Facebook etc.  
Update RWT website.
4. Contact contractors not yet on site to stop them moving.
5. Prepare for financial consequences.

#### Cancellation once Festival has opened (from 1800 on Friday 17 May):

1. General Announcement on lines of Show Stop procedure. People must be asked to evacuate in an orderly manner. If the car park at Stockers Farm is not affected, people may return to their cars: but the car park team have to be ready to supervise a mass exit of people not necessarily very impressed – *statement required for them.*

2. Stop further people coming in, at Batchworth, Stockers and across the Aquadrome. *Police officers will be required.*
3. Exhibitors should be asked to pack up quickly and quietly for a controlled evacuation as advised by the Police.
4. Contractors should be informed. Their shut-down and removal plans will almost certainly be affected.
5. Prepare for financial consequences.

### **Precautions against main threats**

#### **1. Vehicle as a weapon**

We assess that the greatest vulnerability is the main concourse in the Aquadrome, where rows of exhibitors attract a sizeable crowd which includes visitors passing through on their way to other parts of the site. Given that access to the car park is already restricted to exhibitors and performers and is effectively closed by the time the Festival opens each day, a threat vehicle has to approach by crossing Frogmoor Bridge and driving along the approach road. While there are always numbers of people in that road, the mature trees on each side of it complicate the vehicle attack there. Access to the Aquadrome itself is through the 'club' gate, which can be closed to allow pedestrian but not vehicle access. If vehicle access is required, the gate can readily be opened and then closed again.

#### **Precaution 1 – 'Club' gate to be closed during the Festival hours.**

#### **2. Portable IED**

It is commonplace for small packages to be carried by children and to some extent by adults, and they are often lost and found. It is less common for adults to be carrying larger rucksacks, and they should give rise to suspicion. Consideration should be given to asking to check such a bag, perhaps with the support of a police officer. This should be done as far as possible to one side of the main crowd.

#### **Precaution 2 – be suspicious of large packs or rucksacks being carried into the Festival site.**

It is at least as likely that an IED will be left covertly, and guidance on the response to this is at Appendix 1 - it will be issued as part of the Safety Plan.

#### **Precaution 3 – be ready to respond to the finding of a suspect package.**

## **Phase 2 – Execution and response to an Incident**

Should an incident occur, the first priority is to prevent further casualties – see above, 'Cancellation after Opening'. The Show Stop procedure will be used at once, the immediate area cleared, and evacuation of the Festival site (both Batchworth and the Aquadrome) started in an orderly and controlled way.

The Emergency Services will be called immediately (the Police and St John Ambulance will have a presence on site, the Fire and Rescue Service may well be present also). The ETHANE Mnemonic below (also at Appendix 2) may be helpful in taking the immediate actions.

### **Exact location**

- Confirm location.
- Geographic size of the incident

### **Type of incident**

- Explosion, firearms incident, vehicle as weapon etc.

### **Hazards**

- Identify the hazards present or suspected (e.g. number of hostiles, types of weapons etc.)
- Consider potential or secondary devices
- Is evacuation necessary and safe?

### **Access routes**

- Update with routes that are safe to use
- Clarify routes which are blocked or unavailable.

### **Number of casualties**

- List type and severity
- Approximate number of dead, injured, survivors and witnesses

### **Emergency services**

- List those services present and those required
- Conduct with the emergency services a joint dynamic assessment of the further hazards.

The detail of the next stage, Incident Management, of an emergency response will be worked out with the Police. This short document is intended to reflect the current advice of the Police as to the threat to the Festival and the consequent risk, and to prompt consideration of what might be required should one of these situations arise.



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Subsequent stages (Crisis Management largely with TRDC, then Business Continuity and Recovery largely for RWT itself) will require more detailed albeit rapid planning. They will depend very largely on what has actually happened: the main purpose of including them here is to draw attention to the need not to be taken by surprise if the need should arise to deal with them.

## **Appendix 1 - Suspicious items and potential IED**

### **1. GUIDANCE FOR THE PUBLIC**

When dealing with suspicious items:

- Do not touch
- Try and identify an owner in the immediate area.
- If you still think it's suspicious, don't feel embarrassed or think somebody else will report it.
- Report it to a member of the Festival Team, security or Police. If they are not available dial 999 (do not use your mobile phone in the immediate vicinity).
- Move away to a safe distance - Even for a small item such as a briefcase move at least 100m away from the item starting from the centre and moving out.

### **2. GUIDANCE FOR FESTIVAL STAFF:**

When dealing with **suspicious items** apply the 4 Cs protocol:

**Confirm, clear, communicate and control,**

#### **2.1 CONFIRM whether or not the item exhibits recognisably suspicious characteristics.**

The HOT protocol may be used to inform your judgement:

##### **Is it Hidden?**

- Has the item been deliberately concealed or is it obviously hidden from view?

##### **Obviously suspicious?**

- Does it have wires, circuit boards, batteries, tape, liquids or putty-like substances visible?
- Do you think the item poses an immediate threat to life?

##### **Is the item Typical of what you would expect to find in this location?**

- Most lost property is found in locations where people congregate. Ask if anyone has left the item.
- If the item is assessed to be unattended rather than suspicious, examine further before applying lost property procedures.

## **2.2 CLEAR the immediate area**

- Do not touch it
- Take charge and move people away to a safe distance. Even for a small item such as a briefcase move at least 100m away from the item starting from the centre and moving out.
- Keep yourself and other people out of line of site of the item. It is a broad rule, but generally if you cannot see the item then you are better protected from it.
- Think about what you can hide behind. Pick something substantial and keep away from glass such as windows and skylights.
- Cordon off the area.

## **2.3 COMMUNICATE – Call 999**

- inform your control room and/or supervisor
- do not use radios within 15 metres.

**Remember:** If you think it's suspicious, say something

## **2.4 CONTROL access to the cordoned area**

- members of the public should not be able to approach the area until it is deemed safe.
- try and keep eyewitnesses on hand so they can tell police what they saw.

## Appendix 2 – Emergency Response

### **ETHANE:**

#### **Exact location**

- Confirm location.
- Geographic size of the incident

#### **Type of incident**

- Explosion, firearms incident, vehicle as weapon etc.

#### **Hazards**

- Identify the hazards present or suspected (e.g. number of hostiles, types of weapons etc.)
- Consider potential or secondary devices
- Is evacuation or invacuation necessary and safe?

#### **Access routes**

- Update with routes that are safe to use
- Clarify routes which are blocked or unavailable.

#### **Number of casualties**

- List type and severity
- Approximate number of dead, injured, survivors and witnesses

#### **Emergency services**

- List those services present and those required
- Conduct a joint dynamic hazard assessment with the emergency services